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1. Introduction  
In a world of  incomplete information, the degree of  investor knowledge of  assets and firms should 
be an important determinant of  investment decisions and of  firm value. Merton (1987) states that 
“an investor must at least know the firm before deciding whether to purchase the stock or acquire 
more information.” In his model, each investor knows only a subset of  available stocks and invests 
only in the stocks of  which she is “aware.” One of  the model’s predictions is that investor 
recognition of  stocks is a determinant of  firm value: an increase in “the degree of  investor 
recognition” will reduce the cost of  capital and increase firm value.  
Prior literature has provided evidence of  the impact of  investor recognition on investor 
behavior, shareholder base, and stock liquidity. However, evidence of  the impact of  investor 
recognition on firm value remains scant. This paper attempts to contribute to the literature by 
investigating the effect of  media coverage of  CEOs, as a factor of  “investor recognition,” on firm 
value, and on CEO ability to extract rents in the form of  compensation.  
Investors can “recognize” a firm through many channels. Our paper focuses on one 
channel—the media coverage of  CEOs—as there is indication that CEOs have become more visible 
to investors and have assumed tasks that are not related merely to management, but to public 
relations. In some cases, the press has devoted more coverage to CEOs than to firms (Hamilton and 
Zeckhauser (2004)).1 As a result, some CEOs become not only the public face of  the company, but 
its actual embodiment (Fisman et al., forthcoming). There has been some evidence that investors are 
influenced by media coverage of  CEOs. A survey of  institutional investors by Russell Reynolds 
Associates (2003) documents, for example, that the presence of  a “high-profile” CEO is one of  the 
factors influencing investment decisions.  
 Our paper’s main hypothesis is that the probability that a firm is known, and credited by 
investors increases with the incidence of  the CEO’s appearance in the media and the quality of  
media coverage. Because of  incomplete information, investors rely at least partially on public 
information to make decisions. Media coverage may help removing some uncertainty, bringing in 
more transparency, adding credibility, and highlighting the viability of  future projects. Through their 
coverage, firms might become more credible, more familiar to investors, and thus more valuable. 
Merton (1987, page 500) notes: “A newspaper or other mass media story about the firm or its 
                                                 
1 For example, in 2000, Jack Welch of General Electric figured 30 times in the headline or cover page of the world leading 
media outlets, including Business Week, the Financial Times, and Newsweek. These data result from a search in the Lexis-Nexis 
Executive database.)  
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industry that reaches a large number of  investors who are not currently shareholders, could include 
some of  this number to incur the set-up costs and follow the firm ... these investors would evaluate 
the detailed substantive information about the firm, become shareholders, and the value of  the firm 
would rise.” Information collection, though largely available on the internet or other open sources, is 
still time-consuming and sometimes costly (Dyck and Zingales (2003)). By including a piece of  news 
on CEOs, media outlets such as newspapers may change the cost of  information for investors and 
provide credibility and reputation for firms and CEOs. In the context of  investors’ limited 
knowledge, media coverage of  CEOs might help reducing investors’ “home bias,” or their 
preference to invest in domestic stocks or stocks they know about (French and Poterba (1991), 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), and Huberman (2001)). Media coverage might be even more 
important for individual and uninformed investors because they face a significant growing number 
of  stocks of  listed companies. Barber and Odean (2008, page 786) note that “When buying a stock, 
investors are faced with a formidable search problem. There are thousands of  common stocks from 
which to choose. There are cognitive—and temporal limits—to how much information we process.” 
Thus, even news which is not new, but disseminated by credible media, still wields impact on 
investors and increases firm value.  
Based on two indices of  media coverage and positive coverage of  Fortune 500 CEOs between 
1992 and 2002, our empirical analysis provides a number of  findings.2 First, media coverage and 
positive coverage of  CEOs positively impact firm value, as measured by Tobin’s q. The result is 
robust to various causality checks and alternative econometric methods. Second, the economic 
impact of  media coverage is significant. Portfolios of  firms with lower media coverage of  CEOs are 
associated with lower subsequent abnormal returns. Portfolios of  firms in the highest quintiles of  
the indices of  media coverage and positive media coverage outperform those in the lowest quintiles 
by 8 and 7 percent per year, respectively, over the sample period. Third, media coverage helps CEOs 
extract rents in the form of  compensation. CEOs appear to enjoy a pay rise above and beyond what 
they obtain from the increase in firm value that arises due to media coverage. For an average CEO in 
the sample, media coverage is associated with a CEO pay rise of  $295,830, which amounts to 4.1 
percent of  the average CEO total pay of  $7.23 million. The effect is stronger for positive media 
coverage.    
To my knowledge, this paper is among the first to investigate the impact of  media coverage of  
                                                 
2 Fortune 500 companies are, by definition, already well known among investors. If we still find a media effect on investor 
recognition on these firms, the result is expected to be stronger with respect to firms that are less well known.  
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CEOs on firm value, and differs from related previous research in several ways. First, while other 
papers use an event study approach to measure the impact (namely drift and reversal) of  specific 
news releases or announcements on stock prices, this paper uses a long-term approach to show the 
effects of  aggregate volume of  news and positive news on firm value. Chan (2003), for example, 
uses event studies to investigate stock reaction after a news release in headlines, and finds that stocks 
with negative returns and a news story underperform their size-, book-to-market, and 
return-matched peers. Stocks with good news show less drift. In a similar approach, Meschke (2004) 
relies on event studies to measure the impact of  specific news (CEO interviews on CNBC) on stock 
price and trading volume. Second, in contrast to the many papers that study market under- or 
overreactions to specific good or bad news, this paper does not make such a distinction, but focuses 
instead on the effects of  aggregate volume of  news, including bad and good news, on firm valuation. 
In this aspect, the paper is more related to Mitchell and Mulherin (1994). The empirical evidence 
resulting from panel data analysis suggests that the aggregate level of  both “good” news and “bad” 
is good for firm value in the long-run.  
Our study relies on, and is related to several strands of  literature on the impact of  media 
coverage. Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) investigate the relationship between media coverage 
and movement of  stock prices. In line with Niederhoffer (1971), they find that media coverage 
cannot explain stock prices or aggregate price movements. These results support the view that the 
media play little role, repeat only already-known news, and do not convey useful information. By 
contrast, many other papers find supporting evidence on the real impact of  media coverage. Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1994) document that the daily number of  news reports released by Dow Jones and 
aggregate measures of  overall market activities, including trading volume and market returns, are 
directly related and share common day-of-the week patterns. Huberman and Regev (2001) find that 
news of  a cancer-cure drug reported in the New York Times, which was previously made public, still 
caused stock price to quadruple the following day. Meschke (2004) documents that CEO interviews 
on CNBC, which are non-events per se, lead to a significant price increase of  1.65 percent and 
higher trading volume on the interview day. Antweiler and Frank (2004) find that a positive shock to 
the message board posting predicts negative returns on the next day. Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 
(2004) document that greater advertising expenditure, as a proxy for a firm’s visibility, leads to a 
larger number of  both individual and institutional investors, and better liquidity. Tetlock (2007) finds 
that levels of  media pessimism in the daily content of  a column in the Wall Street Journal predict 
downward pressure on market prices and affect market trading volume. Barber and Odean (2008) 
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find that individual investors tend to be net purchasers of  stock on “high attention” days (days of  
high abnormal trading volume and extreme price movement), and days where stocks are “in the 
news”. Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) find that negative coverage on executive pay is more related 
to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay. Kuhnen and Niessen (2012) find that the content of  
media coverage, a proxy for social norms on executive compensation, does impact executive pay.  
Our work is perhaps more closely related to Fang and Peress (2009) who find that stocks with 
no media coverage earn higher returns than stocks with high media coverage. Their results seem to 
be opposite to ours. However, their paper focuses on media coverage of  firms, while we focus on 
media coverage of  CEOs. Moreover, we study the media coverage of  CEOs of  large and 
well-known firms, while their paper investigates the difference in stock returns between firms with 
high level of  media coverage and firms with no media coverage. Several recent papers also study the 
impact of  media coverage in different contexts such as in IPOs (Liu at al. (2013)), through Google 
search (Da et al. (2011)), in mergers and acquisitions (Ahern et al. (2014)), and through “spin” of  
investor relations’ firms (Solomon (2012)). 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several lines. First, our empirical evidence sheds light 
on the rationale of  firms and CEOs in the process of  building up communication and media 
coverage, and on the impact of  media coverage on firm value, an important prediction of  Merton’s 
model. Second, we contribute to a growing literature related to investors’ behavior (home bias 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), familiarity (Huberman, 2001), cognitive limits of  investors (Barber 
and Odean, 2008)) and the media’s role in the economy (Dyck and Zingales (2002, 2003), Dyck et al. 
(2008), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)).  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the database and the indices. Section 3 
studies the relationship between media coverage of  CEOs and firm valuation. Section 4 reports 
checks of  robustness. Section 5 and Section 6 measure the impact of  media coverage on firm 
valuation and CEO rent extraction, respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data and indices of  media coverage  
2.1. Sample  
The sample includes firms on Fortune 500 lists from the period between 1992 and 2002. I choose 
1992 as the starting year because it is the year when Execucomp becomes available, providing 
detailed data on CEOs. I first study the sample of  241 firms present for 11 consecutive years and 
later extend the sample to firms present at least 6 out of  11 years of  the sample period.  
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Stock prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I obtain first, middle, 
and last names of  CEOs, and data related to executive compensation and financial ratios from 
Execucomp, Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM) index from the Investment Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) database, and accounting data from Compustat. Fama-French HML, SMB, RMRF, 
and momentum factors are available from Kenneth French’s web page.  
I merge data from all these sources into a single database and compute Tobin’s q for each firm 
at the end of  each year. Panels A and B of  Table 1 show descriptive statistics of  firms and CEOs. 
Firms in the sample are large, with average sales of  $14 billion, assets of  $34 billion, and market 
value of  $20 billion. Maximum annual sales reach $206 billion (Exxon Mobil, in 2000). Maximum 
market value is $507 billion (General Electric, in 1999).  
The average CEO earns cash compensation (salary and bonuses) of  $2.06 million, with a 
maximum of  $43.5 million (Steve Jobs of  Apple, in 2001). The highest total CEO compensation, 
excluding exercised options, is $575.6 million (Michael Eisner of  Disney, in 1998). The highest total 
compensation, including exercised options, reaches $600.3 million (Steve Jobs, in 2000).  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.2. Construction of  media coverage indices  
The principal challenge of  this research is to find a way to quantify CEO exposure to media, which, 
to my knowledge, has not been hitherto developed. Thus, I construct a set of  indices based on a 
search in the Lexis-Nexis database with a system of  filters. I have basically two choices of  sources 
of  news. The first is to choose a unique media outlet as the source of  reference. The advantage of  
this method is to avoid the double counting of  news and the noise caused by non-mainstream 
newspapers. However, this advantage has to be weighed against the risks of  missing news and 
limited coverage. Veldkamp (2006) and Hamilton and Zeckhauser (2004) follow this approach by 
using respectively the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal. The alternative method that I follow 
is to choose a number of  reliable sources of  news.  
As the search window, I choose Lexis-Nexis Executive, which is equivalent to Lexis-Nexis 
Professional Power Search, the most complete and powerful Lexis-Nexis search engine. As search 
options, I choose “Non-Restricted to Major Stories” and “All Major World Publications” in order to 
obtain complete news or stories on CEOs. I do not limit the search to “Major Stories” because it 
might reduce news that fits the search criteria. “Major World Publications” include all important 
newspapers, media outlets in developed and developing worlds, and scripts from audio and 
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television programs.3  
I only use a CEO’s last name, not her full name (first, middle, and last names), and her firm 
name in the search because the media rarely report a CEO’s complete name. Instead, they usually 
report only a CEO’s last name and first name, or sometimes, only a CEO’s last name and nickname, 
or the familiar form of  the first name. This reporting practice may be in conflict with Execucomp, 
which reports CEOs’ complete names. Potential confusion about names might be a problem. My 
solution is to use only a CEO’s last name, which all publications and Execucomp report, and add 
company name in the search window to be sure that only news associating a CEO with her company 
are extracted. I also manually verify the cases of  very common last names (i.e., Smith, John) to avoid 
errors caused by similar names.  
Results from such a Search Window provide me with the first index, Media Coverage of  CEOs 
Index (MCI index), which is the total annual number of  news items related to each CEO in the 
Major World Publications. The second index, Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs (ChI index), is 
derived from the MCI index and measures the aggregate level of  positive media coverage of  CEOs. 
To obtain the ChI index, I insert filters in the form of  keywords in the Search Window. The Search 
Window will select from the Major World Publications all news that describes CEOs with one of  the 
following words: “charisma,” “visionary,” “flamboyant,” “legendary,” “stature,” “personality,” 
“rock-star,” “missionary,” “profile,” or “inspiring.” According to Rakesh Khurana (2002), these 
words are the most frequently used by the media to describe a charismatic and mediatized CEO. 
Though not perfect, the use of  keywords allows us to overcome difficulties in measuring the 
positiveness of  news stories.4 The alternative method is to read carefully all news items and put 
them into classes, such as absolutely positive, positive, rather positive, neutral, rather negative, 
negative, or absolutely negative. This approach has been used by Hambrick et al. (1997) to measure 
CEO hubris in dozens of  acquisitions. However, the number of  CEOs and news items in my 
sample makes this approach impractical.  
Lexis-Nexis enables the search for all words associated with a common root by use of  an 
exclamation mark (“!”). For example, by inserting “charisma!” in the Search Window, Lexis-Nexis 
will search for all words related to charisma, such as “charisma,” and “charismatic.” Hence, to avoid 
missing news items, I add a “!” in each keyword: “charisma!” or “vision!” or “flamboyan!” or “legend!” or 
                                                 
3 For the United States, this source collects news published in the most important journals, such as the Wall Street Journal, New 
York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post, as well as scripts from audio and television programs such as CNBC. See 
Lexis-Nexis for the complete list of media outlets. 
4 This index does not pretend to take into account all the positiveness of news. It is at best a possible measure. Throughout the 
paper, the ChI index has been used as a complement to the MCI index. 
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“stature!” or “personalit!” or “rock-star!” or “mission!” or “profile!” or “inspir!.” The search results will be 
all news coverage on CEOs, including any of  the keywords or their direct derivatives. The two 
indices are constructed on an annual basis for the period from January 1 to December 31 of  every 
year. To avoid errors in the search process caused by similar CEO names or change of  company 
names (e.g., from American Home Products to Wyeth; Philips Morris to Altria), I manually check 
the cases that have both indices equal to zero.  
While the MCI index is not affected, there might be a concern about the counting of  news 
relying on root words for the ChI index. For example, “charisma” and “lack of  charisma” may both 
be counted, while the former indicates positive news, and the latter, negative coverage. Indeed, my 
search method cannot make a distinction between these two cases. However, after manual checks, I 
find that these cases are quite rare since media tend to use subsequently several words in the Search 
Term, reducing de facto this risk. Furthermore, as reported in Figure I, the strong and positive 
correlation between MCI and ChI indices (+96.15 percent) may indicate that more often when a 
CEO is in the news, the coverage is likely to be positive.  
Panel C of  Table 1 shows that, in the Major World Publications, an average CEO receives 57.1 
news accounts per year. The maximum coverage has been attained by Bill Gates of  Microsoft in 
1998, with 3,681 news stories, or an average of  10 stories a day. The minimum coverage is zero 
stories per year. An average CEO has 13 positive news stories per year, with a maximum of  785 
stories (Bill Gates, in 1999), and a minimum of  zero.  
 
2.3. Dependent and control variables  
2.3.1. Dependent variable  
Tobin’s q is the ratio obtained by dividing the market value of  assets by the replacement cost of  
assets. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Yermack (1996), among others, describe some methods 
to compute q. This paper follows their method, but in a less complex way: 
  
Tobin’s q = (Market Value of  Stocks + Total Assets – Book Value of  Equities) / (Total Assets)5  
 
In the paper, Tobin’s q is the dependent variable for the majority of  tests. Panel A of  Table 1 
shows that year-end Tobin’ q of  an average company is 1.87, with a maximum of  19 (Dell Inc., in 
1998) and a minimum of  0.6.  
                                                 
5 All the data are from Compustat (Total Assets: Data 6; Market Value of Stocks: (Data 199*Data 25)/1000; Book Value of 
Equities: Data 11).  
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2.3.2. Control variables  
The relation between Tobin’s q and the MCI and ChI indices may be spurious because of  the 
possible impact of  many factors on both Tobin’s q and the indices. Previous research by Morck et al. 
(1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), Yermack (1996), and Gompers et al. (2003) examine determinants of  
Tobin’s q. I take into account all of  these factors in the empirical analysis.  
Expenditures on research and development (Compustat Data 46) are the main sources of  
innovation that may determine future profits (Morck et al. (1988)), while capital expenditure 
(Compustat Data 128) represents possibilities of  investments and future prospects (Yermack (1996)), 
I thus add R&D expenditures over sales and capital expenditure over sales as control variables. 
Firms with prior strong growth usually witness higher q. For this reason, I control for sales growth 
during the last one, three, and five years (SALECHG, SALE3LS, and SALE5LS in Execucomp). 
Prior returns have an obviously important impact on firm valuation. I take into account prior 
growth rate, which is proxied by lagged earnings per share (EPSEXCHG, EPSEX3LS, and 
EPSEX5LS in Execucomp).  
Characteristics of  a CEO may determine her capability. In all test models, I control for CEO 
tenure. Due to a lack of  information on CEO age in Execucomp, I only control for CEO age in a 
robustness check. Apart from prior firm performance (ROA, sales growth, etc.), I also control for 
CEO ability by using as specific proxies those presented in Table 3.  
Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) and Jain and Wu (2000) find that advertising expenditure 
affects liquidity and performance. There might be a correlation between expenses for advertising 
and the media coverage of  firms and CEOs. I control for advertising expenditures (Compustat Data 
45) normalized by total assets in a check of  robustness because of  the serious lack of  advertising 
data in Compustat.  
Daines (2001) finds that companies incorporated in Delaware have a substantially higher q. 
Gompers et al. (2003) find that governance quality impacts firm valuation. I thus include a 
Delaware-incorporated dummy and the GIM index as control variables.  
Firms of  different sizes and in different industries belong to different capital markets and have 
different capital structure and characteristics. I systematically control for firm size by log of  total 
assets in constant dollar; for industry and year, by including two-digit SIC codes and year dummies.  
 
3. Media coverage of  CEOs and firm valuation  
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This section explores empirically the relationship between the media coverage of  CEOs and firm 
value. My main measure of  firm value is Tobin’s q. There are many controversial views on Tobin’s q, 
but my purpose is merely to use Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value.  
The previous section explains how MCI and ChI indices are constructed. The first index is an 
aggregate measure of  CEO exposure to media. The second index, derived from the first, measures 
positive media coverage of  CEOs. Though not perfect, these indices adequately capture the volume 
of  media coverage of  CEOs, quantify the flow of  information on CEOs, and provide broad and 
observable measures of  news on CEOs and of  judgments of  CEOs by the media.  
 
3.1. Media coverage of  CEOs and firm valuation: OLS regressions  
I run OLS models relating Tobin’s q to indices of  media coverage of  CEOs, with Tobin’s q of  
firms, measured at the end of  each year from 1992 to 2002 as the dependent variable. Main 
independent variables are the MCI and ChI indices. The OLS models are the following:  
 
Tobin’s q = α + β(MCI) + γ(Control Variables) + ε  
Tobin’s q = α + β(ChI) + γ(Control Variables) + ε 
 
Control variables are factors that can potentially determine Tobin’s q, such as CEO and firm 
characteristics, potential growth, prior performance, and law and governance. Following Morck et al. 
(1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), and Yermack (1996), I control for firm size, measured by log of  sales 
in million of  dollars. Daines (2001) finds that Delaware corporate law improves firm value and 
facilitates the sale of  public firms. I thus include a Delaware-incorporated dummy in all tests. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct an index representing firm governance from 24 
charter provisions (the GIM index) and find that companies with weak shareholder rights (high 
GIM) are associated with lower q. I include the GIM index as another control variable for Tobin’s q.  
Similar to Myers (1977), Smith and Watts (1992), and Yermack (1996), I further include, as 
control variables for Tobin’s q, the Capex ratio (capital expenditures over sales) as a proxy for future 
opportunities, the R&D ratio (R&D budget over sales), as well as sales and EPS change from the last 
one, three, and five years. Regressions also control for CEO characteristics (age, tenure), and ability 
(prior EPS and sales growth), as well as for firm characteristics, and industry and year dummies.  
The results are reported in Table 2. Regressions (1) and (3) in Panel A show that coefficient 
estimates on the MCI and ChI indices are all positive and significant at the one percent level when 
no control variables are included. In regressions (2) and (4), I include all control variables mentioned 
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above. After controlling for numerous factors, coefficient estimates of  the MCI and ChI indices 
remain positive and significant at the one percent level. Coefficient estimates of  other variables are 
in majority significant in the expected and conventional direction. R&D ratio and prior performance 
(sales and EPS) appear, for example, to be important determinants of  Tobin’s q.  
Simple OLS tests show positive and significant correlations between media coverage, positive 
media coverage of  CEOs, and firm valuation after taking into account numerous potential 
determinants of  firm value. The estimated coefficients of  ChI are five times larger than those of  
MCI, indicating that the effect of  positive media coverage of  CEOs on firm valuation is stronger 
than that of  media coverage of  CEOs (even after taking into account the fact that the mean of  MCI 
is four times larger than the mean of  ChI).6  
 
3.2. Panel data analysis  
The results from OLS regressions are interesting but may differ across firms. It is also probable that 
unobservable firm characteristics are likely to affect firm value, as well as the potential relationship 
between media coverage of  CEOs and firm value. Since the sample includes firms present in the 
sample in every year of  the 1992–2002 year period, balanced panel data analysis can be used to take 
into account firm-fixed or random effects.  
Using Tobin’s q at the end of  each calendar year from 1992 to 2002 as the dependent variable; 
the MCI and ChI indices as main independent variables, respectively; and the same control variables 
as in Panel A of  Table 2, I estimate fixed and random firm effect coefficients. Results presented in 
Panel B of  Table 2 show positive and significant fixed- and random-effect estimates at the one 
percent level for both the MCI and ChI indices. The estimated coefficients of  the ChI index are also 
about five times larger than those of  the MCI index in both fixed-effect and random-effect 
estimations, indicating a stronger relationship between positive media coverage of  CEOs and firm 
value.  
 
3.3. CEO ability 
One might argue that CEO innate ability or competence should at least partially determine firm 
value. The problem is that CEO competence or ability is inherently hard to identify, let alone 
                                                 
6 I also perform a test for whether the difference in coefficient estimates of the MCI and ChI indices (regressions (2) and (4) in 
Panel A of Table II) is statistically significant. The t-value, computed by dividing the difference of the two coefficient estimates 
by the square root of the sum of the squares of the two coefficient estimates’ standard errors, is 3.54, indicating that the difference 
in coefficient estimates is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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quantify. It is even more challenging to separate CEO ability from firm specific factors. If  we 
consider that CEO ability translates into firm performance, previous tests, by including prior firm 
performance as control variables, do partially take into account CEO ability.  
In this section, I go a step further in controlling for CEO ability, which is measured by the 
capacities to consistently outperform peers in the same industry when prior performance is good 
and to reverse bad prior performance. This measure has been used in the literature on the 
performance of  mutual funds managers.7 Precisely, I use the excess of  prior firm performance to 
the value-weighted average and the median performance of  their four-digit SIC code industry 
respectively as benchmarks for CEO ability. Some CEOs in the sample may be in the office for only 
one, two, or three years. Firm prior performance is thus the product of  former CEOs. To avoid this 
bias, I eliminate CEOs with less than three years of  tenure.  
Table 3 shows that, after taking into account CEO ability, I still find a positive and significant 
relationship between media coverage of  CEOs and firm valuation at the one percent level. The 
results are consistent when either lagged excess stock returns over the mean (in models (1) and (2)) 
or over the median (in models (1) and (2) of  Table 3) of  the average stock returns of  the 4-digit SIC 
code industry are used as proxies for CEO ability. As in previous tests, estimated coefficients of  the 
MCI and ChI indices are positive and statistically significant. The tests also confirm that CEO ability 
does determine firm value: proxies for CEO ability are positively and significantly related to Tobin’s 
q at the conventional levels.  
Using the same regression framework as in Table 3 and controlling for firm fixed and random 
effects, I find qualitatively similar (not reported) results. The coefficients on media coverage indices 
are positive and significant, and are of  comparable magnitude to coefficients presented in Table 3.     
 
3.4. Media coverage and firm valuation: Endogeneity and 3-SLS regressions  
Results from OLS and panel data analysis in previous sections show a strong and significant 
association between media coverage of  CEOs and firm value. Unfortunately, they can not tell us 
about causality, or at least the direction of  this relationship.  
One can imagine a complicated, three-way relation between CEO ability, CEO media coverage, 
and firm value in which each factor simultaneously determines the other. Previous models do take 
into account CEO ability (as exogenous factors) but say nothing about possible simultaneous and 
subsequent relations between media coverage and firm valuation.  
                                                 
7 See, for example, Brown et al. (1995).  
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In this section, I address this problem by using a system of  simultaneous equations and a 
three-stage estimation for systems of  simultaneous equations (3-SLS) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
The first equation is the structural equation used in previous sections from which I find that 
controlling for CEO ability, firm prior performance, growth prospects, and firm and CEO 
characteristics, media coverage of  CEOs affects firm valuation. The second equation postulates the 
inverse hypothesis: it is firm current value that determines the current level of  CEO media coverage, 
controlling for CEO ability and characteristics, firm current and prior performance, and 
firm-specific factors. This equation is based on the idea that media tend to bring more coverage to 
“success stories” of  CEOs and of  firms with good current and/or past performance. Other things 
being equal, if  a CEO achieved a higher q during prior years, she and her firm will be more likely to 
be “in the news,” resulting in more coverage and more positive coverage. It is reasonable to think 
that CEO ability, translated into superior performance over its industry peers; CEO and firm 
characteristics; and firm current and prior performance are main determinants of  the level of  CEO 
media coverage.  
The system of  estimation allows the two equations to be estimated simultaneously. Thus, 
regression results of  each equation allow us to capture separate effects of  media coverage on firm 
value and vice and versa. To avoid “survival bias” of  CEOs, I only retain CEOs who hold office 
during at least 3 three years in the sample period. The main difference between the two equations is 
that the first includes some variables serving as the identification (or instrument variables). A good 
instrument is a variable strongly correlated with firm value while being non-correlated with media 
coverage of  CEOs. Daines (2001) shows that firms incorporated in Delaware exhibit a higher 
Tobin’s q than those of  other firms, even though it is not evident that any strong correlation 
between the level of  media coverage of  CEOs and the place of  incorporation should exist. 
Consequently, I include a Delaware-incorporated indicator as one of  the instrument variables in the 
3-SLS regression system. For the same reason, I include GIM index, R&D ratio, and Capex ratio as 
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other instruments.         
Table 4 reports the results from 3-SLS regressions of  the simultaneous equations. Taking into 
account possible endogenous and simultaneous relations between CEO media coverage and firm 
value, I still find that media coverage is a determinant of  firm value. The estimated coefficient of  the 
MCI index in equation is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient on MCI 
index is similar to what we obtain in Table 3.    
As an alternative, I use the population of  the county in which a firm is headquartered as an 
instrument variable. The argument is that, since the media are more active in areas with large 
populations, the number of  the population of  the firm’s headquarter county is positively correlated 
with the number of  news items on a CEO, while the county population can hardly correlate with 
firm value. I find robust results that are not reported. 
 The results from this section are important in that they confirm the positive and significant 
association between media coverage of  CEOs and firm value, and at the same time, show the 
direction and the extent of  the relationship.  
 
4. Checks of  robustness  
4.1. Alternative control variables 
A subjective choice of  control variables may generate errors. The use of  alternative measures of  
control variables helps avoid those risks. Firm size has been measured by log of  sales. Thus, I use 
respectively log of  total assets, log of  market value, and log of  sales of  the prior year. For growth 
opportunity, I use depreciation over sales as an alternative to R&D ratio and Capex ratio. As 
performance variables, I use simultaneously ROA, sale change, EPS, and dividend yield change. I 
re-run regressions using those alternative variables. The results are not reported as I do not find any 
significantly different results than those in previous sections.  
 
4.2. Use of  lagged indices and relative indices  
In Table 2, I relate the MCI and ChI indices, measured annually, on Tobin’s q, measured at the end 
of  each year. It might be more interesting to study the relation between lagged MCI and ChI indices 
and current firm valuation because it may indicate the causality direction. Thus, I replicate tests in 
previous sections, but use one-year lagged MCI and ChI as main independent variables. I obtain 
similar results that are not reported.  
Both indices used in previous tests are in absolute numbers. However, the use of  a relative 
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index, to measure the percentage of  positive media coverage over the overall level of  media 
coverage of  CEOs, might be more interesting. Thus, I construct a new variable by dividing the ChI 
index by the MCI index and call this Relative Media Index Coverage of  CEOs, or R-MCI. With an 
average of  23.66 percent, a minimum of  zero, and a maximum of  100 percent, the R-MCI indicates 
that, on average, 23.66 percent of  news related to CEOs is positive reports, or good news. Using 
OLS and panel data regressions of  Tobin’s q on R-MCI index, and taking into account the same 
control variables for q as in previous tests, I find similar (not reported) results to previous tests. 
The level of  media coverage might be increasing as a function firm size. Although the use of  
R-MCI might at least control partially for firm size, I further replicate our test using the MCI and 
ChI indices that are scaled by firm size (market capitalization). I do find any qualitatively similar 
results.        
 
4.3. Advertising expense as control variable  
Grullon et al. (2004) find that product market advertising has a direct effect on firm breadth of  
ownership and on the liquidity of  common stocks. Jain and Wu (2000) hypothesize that mutual 
funds that advertised in Barron’s or Money magazines use advertisement as a signal of  fund managers’ 
skills. They find no superior performance in the post-advertisement period. However, advertised 
funds are found, on comparison, to attract significantly more money than does a control group of  
funds. Expenditures on advertising and public relations should have an impact on media coverage. 
Morck et al. (1988) include this factor as a control variable for Tobin’s q. However, fewer than half  
of  the firms in my sample provide data on advertising (Compustat Data Item 45). I thus do not use 
advertising expense as control variable and only replicate OLS and panel data tests in a sub-sample 
of  firms with full data. I find similar (not reported) results.  
 
4.4. Reverse causality and impacts of  a “Success Factor”  
The first question the paper addresses is how media coverage of  CEOs during a given year affects 
firm valuation at the end of  the year. I find that media coverage has a positive effect on firm 
valuation. However, potential interpretations and the direction of  causality might be debatable. Do 
the visibility and the positive media coverage of  CEOs increase firm value? Or, is this increase 
simply the result of  market frenzies about some firms or industries, which, at the same time, cause a 
higher Tobin’s q and a higher media coverage of  CEOs? Is the significant relation between media 
coverage of  CEOs and firm valuation the result of  a “natural selection” process in which high 
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Tobin’s q firms attract mediatized CEOs? Previous tests that systematically take past performance 
into account and the 3-SLS regressions that allow for the possibility of  a reverse causality address at 
least some of  these issues.  
On the other hand, firms with high prior valuation may naturally help their CEOs get more 
and better exposure to media in the following periods. In these cases, prior high valuation of  
companies, a “success factor,” may cause a current high level of  CEO media coverage, independent 
of  the CEO, rather than the inverse. Consequently, a “firm” effect and a “CEO” effect may be 
separate. If  this is true, one should expect a positive and significant link between prior q and the 
current level of  media coverage of  a newly arrived CEO. To further check robustness of  the results, 
I study the relationship between firm prior performance and the media coverage level of  new CEOs. 
There are 266 CEO turnovers during the 1992–2002 year period. Based on this information, I 
compute and relate prior Tobin’s q for firms that appoint new CEOs to the level of  media coverage 
of  the news CEOs following their appointment.   
In regressions, the main dependent variables are the MCI and ChI indices of  CEOs of  the year 
following CEO appointment. Main independent variables are one-and five-year lagged Tobin’s q 
prior to the year in which CEO turnovers occur. I also control for other benchmarks for firm 
performance that might impact media coverage.  
The regression results reported in Table 5 appear not to support the hypothesis that there is a 
“success factor.” I find no significant relation between lagged Tobin’s q and the current level of  
media coverage of  new CEOs. Consistently, estimated coefficients of  one- and five-year lagged q are 
not statistically significant, indicating that prior Tobin’s q is not a determinant of  the current level of  
MCI and ChI indices of  newly arrived CEOs. The “firm” effect, if  there is one, is thus not 
significant.  
 
5. Economic impact of  media coverage of  CEOs  
5.1. Differences in media coverage and differences in firm value  
Having established that media coverage of  CEOs affects firm valuation, the paper analyzes whether 
the economic impact is relevant. To see how differences in media coverage are associated with 
differences in firm value, I divide firms in the sample in quintiles of  the MCI and ChI indices and 
do a means test of  the difference between the average q of  each quintile. The results are presented 
in Table 6.  
I find, as reported from the first to the fourth column, a monotonic relationship, in that firms 
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with CEOs attracting higher degree of  media coverage or positive coverage obtain a higher q. 
Average q evolves from 1.6 for firms in the lowest quintile of  MCI index to 2.2 for firms in the 
highest quintile of  MCI. The results are similar for ChI index. Results from means tests reported in 
the last column of  Table 6 show that the difference in average Tobin’s q between the lowest quintiles 
of  the MCI and ChI is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Since firms in the sample have 
an average capitalization of  $20.7 billion, this is a substantial difference in economic terms.  
 
5.2. Media coverage of  CEOs and firm value: A portfolio analysis  
Returns of  portfolios based on the MCI and ChI indices may provide some insights into the 
economic impact of  media coverage. Thus, I form portfolios based on the MCI and ChI indices of  
the prior year and compute their returns in the current year. Fama and French (1992, 1993) identify 
three factors that explain realized portfolio returns: exposure to market factor, market capitalization 
(size), and book-to-market ratio. Carhart (1997) finds that another factor, immediate prior returns 
(or momentum), also explains portfolio returns. The four-factor model is the following:  
 
 
 
Rt is the return of  a portfolio in month t. RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return 
minus risk-free rate. SMB (small minus big), HLM (high minus low), constructed by Fama and 
French, are the month t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios that captured size 
and book-to-market. Momentum factor is defined in Carhart (1997). Data on monthly factors are 
available on Kenneth French’s website.  
The alpha in this model is the excess return over passive investment strategies that take into 
account the four factors. In the paper’s context, the alpha embodies the difference due to the choice 
of  portfolio based on the degree of  media coverage and positive media coverage of  CEOs. For a 
year (N), I use the MCI and ChI indices of  the year (N-1) to divide firms in the sample into quintiles. 
Using stock return data from CRSP, I compute monthly returns of  five portfolios of  firms in five 
quintiles of  the indices. Since the sample starts in January 1992 and ends in December 2002, I obtain 
the first portfolio returns in January 1993, and 120 monthly portfolio returns, from January 1993 to 
December 2002.  
Table 7 shows regression results of  monthly portfolio returns on Fama and French, and 
Carhart four factors, and most importantly, the alpha coefficient of  each portfolio. Panel A reports 
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the alphas of  portfolios formed on quintiles of  the MCI index. The first row shows results of  a 
regression where the dependent variable is the difference in monthly returns between the portfolio 
of  firms in the highest quintile and the portfolio of  firms in the lowest quintile of  MCI index. The 
alpha from this estimation, which is 0.66 percent per month or about 8 percent per year, is simply 
the difference in abnormal return between the two portfolios.  
Panel B shows the same regressions based on the ChI index. Similarly, I find an alpha of  0.58 
percent a month (about 7 percent a year), statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting 
that the difference in abnormal return between the portfolio of  firms in the highest quintile and the 
portfolio of  firms in the lowest quintile of  ChI index is about 7 percent a year. The coefficient 
estimates of  alphas for other quintile portfolios, for both indices, are not always monotonic but 
usually significant. Since firms in the sample are large, with an average market capitalization of  $20.7 
billion, these abnormal returns are economically significant.8 
Our results appear to be opposite to Fang and Peress (2009) who find that stocks with no (or 
low) media coverage earn higher returns than stocks with high media coverage. However, our paper 
is different because of  our focus on media coverage of  CEOs, not on media coverage of  firms. 
Moreover, we study the media coverage of  CEOs of  large and well-known firms, not firms with no 
media coverage.   
  
6. Media coverage and CEO rent extraction  
Are media coverage and positive media coverage of  CEOs, which are good for firm value as the 
paper shows so far, also good for the CEOs? Literature sheds little light on what motivates CEOs to 
appear in the media. A CEO may be interested in the celebrity appeal of  being “in the news,” or 
positive coverage might give her the legitimacy to justify a larger pay package or private, fringe 
benefits. Media coverage might provide CEOs with reputation to obtain a better job in the future. 
This idea is closely related to Bebchuk and Fried’s (2003) hypothesis on CEO rent extraction. This 
section investigates the impact of  media coverage on CEO ability to extract rents by focusing on 
CEO pay, and whether the increase in CEO pay is above and beyond what they obtain from the 
increase in firm value that results from media coverage.   
 
                                                 
8 All the portfolio returns are value-weighted. Since I am interested in the impact of aggregate news on firm value, I use annual 
media indices to form portfolio. An alternative is to use monthly media indices. Also, because of the paper’s focus on aggregate 
and long term effects of media coverage, I do not study the under- or overreaction of stock price following specific news as in 
other papers. Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Tetlock (2007) for example find that investors overreact to news.        
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6.1. Media coverage and subsequent CEO pay  
I study how much prior media coverage of  CEOs determines subsequent CEO remuneration. Panel 
A of  Table 8 reports univariate results. I break the sample in quintiles of  one year-lagged MCI and 
ChI indices, from (1), firms whose CEOs are in the lowest quintile, to (5), firms whose CEOs are in 
the highest quintile, and compute the quintile’s average of  CEO compensation. For each year (N), 
MCI and ChI are measured in the year (N-1) and compensation in the year (N).  
Results indicate that a low level of  MCI and ChI indices in a year is associated with a low level 
of  incentive, cash, and total compensation in the following year. An average CEO in the lowest 
quintile of  lagged MCI index earns an incentive compensation of  about $3 million, a cash 
compensation of  $1.5 million, and a total pay of  $4.5 million per year. By comparison, an average 
CEO in the highest quintile of  lagged MCI index earns $12 million, $3.3 million, and $15.3 million 
respectively. For CEO total pay, this mean difference is equivalent to a difference of  $10.8 million 
per year. Results are similar for the ChI index. The last column of  Panel A report results of  means 
tests to compare CEO pay structure in two extreme quintiles of  the one-year lagged MCI and ChI 
indices. For the three components of  CEO pay (incentive, cash, and total pay), the means difference 
is consistently and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
In Panel B of  Table 8, I run OLS regressions relating media coverage of  CEOs to subsequent 
CEO pay. Following Malmendier and Tate (2009), I control for firm size (log of  sales), sales growth, 
CEO tenure, and dummies for years and industries. The main independent variables are 
one-year-lagged MCI and ChI indices. Since one of  the main results of  this paper is that media 
coverage affects firm value, all regressions include prior Tobin’s q as an independent variable to 
capture the direct effect of  increase in firm value on CEO compensation.  
In regressions (1) and (2), with CEO incentive compensation as the dependent variable, I find 
that the lagged MCI and ChI indices are positively and significantly related to one-year-lagged 
Tobin’s q, indicating that past performance is a significant determinant of  subsequent CEO 
incentive pay. Controlling for this effect, media coverage is still positively and significantly related to 
CEO incentive compensation at the ten percent and five percent levels, respectively. Regressions (3) 
and (4) report that subsequent CEO total cash compensation is positively and significantly 
correlated to media coverage of  CEOs, but in a smaller magnitude in comparison to incentive 
compensation. This is not a surprising result, since cash compensation tends to be a fixed 
component. Models (5) and (6) show that lagged MCI and ChI indices are positively and 
significantly correlated to CEO total pay at the 1 percent level with large estimated coefficients, after 
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controlling for prior Tobin’s q.  
Results from Panel B of  Table 8 show that media coverage of  CEOs is a determinant of  every 
component of  subsequent CEO compensation, after controlling for the direct effect of  past 
performance (Tobin’s q) on current pay. From model (5) we learn that a piece of  news in a major 
media outlet is associated with an increase of  total CEO pay worth almost $5,190. Since the average 
CEO in the sample appears 57 times per year in the World Major Publications, media coverage is 
associated annually with an average CEO pay rise of  $295,830, which amounts to 4.1 percent of  the 
average CEO total pay of  $7.23 million. Model (6) of  Panel B shows that the effect of  positive 
media coverage on CEO pay is even stronger, in that one piece of  positive news increases CEO pay 
by $28,670, and, in total, by $372,710 for an average CEO (5.16 percent of  total pay). Since all 
regressions already take into account the increase in CEO pay due to increase in firm value, the 
recorded increase in CEO pay is above and beyond the pay rise that results from firm value increases 
attributable to media coverage.           
 
6.2. Change in media coverage and CEO pay  
To better see how a change in the level of  media coverage impacts subsequent pay, I relate year-end 
pay components to the change in media coverage between a current year and the year before. I 
include the same control variables as in Panel B of  Table 8. Regression results are presented in Table 
9.  
Models (1) and (2), which include CEO incentive compensation as the dependent variable, 
show that change in the levels of  media coverage and positive media coverage are positively and 
significantly related to CEO incentive pay at the one percent level. Estimated coefficients are large, 
suggesting that a small change in media coverage is associated with a large rise in CEO incentive pay.  
Models (3) and (4) replicate regressions (1) and (2) with CEO total cash compensation as the 
dependent variable. The sign of  the estimated coefficients of  the MCI and ChI indices, contrary to 
results from (1) and (2), is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that change in 
CEO media coverage is negatively and significantly related to CEO cash compensation. However, 
the impact is small as estimated coefficients are much smaller that those in regressions (1) and (2). 
With total compensation as the dependent variable, models (5) and (6) show change in media 
coverage is positively and significantly correlated with CEO total pay at the 1 percent level. Large 
and positive coefficients suggest that small change in media coverage leads to big rise in total pay.  
Overall, results from Table 9 confirm that media coverage helps CEOs to obtain a significant 
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pay rise, beyond the beneficial effects of  media coverage on firm value.     
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper studies the impact of  media coverage of  CEOs on firm value and on CEO 
compensation. Using two indices of  media coverage of  Fortune 500 CEOs from 1992 to 2002, I 
find a number of  results. First, media coverage and positive media coverage of  CEOs positively and 
significantly impact firm value. The result is robust to alternative econometric specifications and 
numerous checks of  causality. Second, the economic impact of  media coverage of  CEOs is 
significant. The difference in abnormal return between portfolios of  firms whose CEOs obtain the 
highest level of  media coverage or positive coverage and those with the lowest level is almost 8 and 
7 percent per year, respectively, in terms of  abnormal stock returns. Third, media coverage of  CEOs 
affects CEO ability to extract rents in the form of  compensation. Media coverage is highly related to 
equity-based, incentive compensation, and less positively or even negatively sensitive to cash 
compensation. For an average CEO in the sample, media coverage can increase her pay by $295,830, 
or 4.1 percent of    the average CEO total pay of  $7.23 million in the following year, beyond the 
pay increase induced by the increase in firm value.  
Empirical evidence from the paper sheds light on the rationale of  firms and CEOs in the 
process of  building up personality and communication skills, and on the impact of  investor 
recognition on firm value, an important prediction of  Merton’s model. The paper contributes to a 
growing literature related to investors’ behavior such as home bias (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), 
familiarity (Huberman, 2001), cognitive limits of  investors (Barber and Odean, 2008), and the 
media’s role in the economy and in governance (Dyck and Zingales, 2002, 2003), Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2005).  
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Figure I 
Correlation between the MCI and ChI Indexes and Tobin’s q 
 
This figure reports correlations between Tobin’s q, CEO Media Coverage Index and Positive Media Coverage Index.  
 
                 MCI Index   ChI Index   Tobin’s q 
 
MCI index     1.0000 
 
ChI Index        0.9615      1.0000 
 
Tobin’s q        0.2976      0.2954      1.0000 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of  Firms, CEOs, and Media Coverage of  CEOs 
This table shows descriptive statistics of  firms, CEOs, and media coverage of  CEOs. The sample includes firms in Fortune 500 lists between 1992 and 
2002. I first use the sample of  2,651 firm-years present for 11 consecutive years and later extend the sample to firms present in at least 6 out of  11 
years of  the sample period. Share prices have been extracted from CRSP. Detailed information of  CEOs (first, middle, last names) and data related to 
executive compensation and financial ratios have been provided by Execucomp. The corporate governance GIM index (Gompers-Ishii-Metrick) have 
been extracted from the IRRC database, accounting data from Compustat, Fama-French factors (HML, SMB, RMRF), and momentum factors from 
Kenneth French's web page. I merge data from all these sources into a single database and compute Tobin's q for each firm. 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics  
 
Variables    Obs.   Mean  Std. Dev.        Min          Max  Median 
Sales (in million USD)  2651    14402.98    19991.56     1441.778       206083 8383 
 
Common equity  2651     5648.302    8387.628    -2700.044      103198 3199.4 
(in million USD) 
 
Assets    2651     34913.85    84916.27     496.075       1097190 11051.9 
(in million USD) 
  
Market value   2651     20742.94    40187.72        31.335         507216.7 8079.21 
(in million USD) 
 
Advertising expenditure 842  618.7436    780.4046        1         4600  296.14 
(in million USD) 
 
Sales change 5 years  2474  8.78381    10.22053      -25.604       64.773  6.9 
(percent) 
 
EPS change 5 years  1794  10.39487    18.43958      -69.763      195.804 9.6 
(percent) 
 
ROA change 5 years  2473  5.014436    5.415741  -46.892       45.138  15.18 
(percent) 
 
Dividend yield   2462  2.245254    2.248277  0       56.163  1.99 
(percent) 
 
Tobin’s q    2473  1.871336    1.285207  0.5797153     19.16261 1.43 
 
 
Panel B: CEO characteristics  
 
Variables    Obs.     Mean       Std. Dev.        Min          Max  Median 
CEO cash compensation 2651     2602.64     1938.295  0            43511.54 1620 
(in thousand USD) 
 
Total CEO compensation 2651      7231.022    19257.22  0.001   575595.9 4137.48 
(Excluding exercised options) 
 
Total CEO compensation 2651     7594.616    17579.19  0.001   600347.4 2956.53 
(Including exercised options) 
 
Age    749  58.26  5.94   43   75  59 
 
Tenure    2326  6.9  6.56   0   45  5 
 
 
Panel C: Media Coverage of  CEOs 
 
Variables    Obs.     Mean       Std. Dev.        Min          Max  Median 
Media coverage of  CEOs 2651    57.1047    163.5997        0         3861  18 
(MCI Index, in abs. value) 
 
Positive media coverage 2651      13.18446    40.71042        0          785  4 
(ChI Index, in abs. value) 
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Table 2 
Media Coverage, Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs and Firm Valuation 
This table reports the relationship between media coverage and positive media coverage of  CEOs and firm valuation. Panel A shows OLS regression models relating Tobin’s q measured at the end of  each year to two annual 
proxies for media coverage of  CEOs (MCI and ChI indices). See the text for the construction and definition of  MCI and ChI. Panel B reports results of  panel analysis of  the relationship between media coverage of  CEOs 
and firm valuation. Control variables are firm size (log of  sales); Delaware-incorporated dummy; GIM index; R&D ratio; Capex ratio; change of  sales; change of  EPS for the last one, two, five years; and CEO tenure. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Main independent variables are indices of  Media Coverage and Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs. The sample consists of  2,651 firm-year observations of  241 firms present in the Fortune 
500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. I later extend the sample to firms present in at least 6 out of  11 years of  the sample period. Estimated coefficients are marked with three, two, or one star if  significant at 
the 1, 5, or 10 percent levels, respectively, with standard errors in brackets. 
 
Panel A: OLS Tests                       Panel B: Panel Data Analysis 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  Variables Fixed effect (1)  Fixed effect (2)  Random effect 
(3) 
Random effect (4) 
Media coverage of  CEOs 
(MCI Index, in abs. value) 
0.0024*** 
(0.00015) 
0.0014***  
 (0.0003)    
   Media coverage of  CEOs 
(MCI Index, in abs. value) 
0.00175***   
(0.0004)        
 0.0015***   
(0.00033)      
 
           
Positive media coverage of  CEOs  
(ChI Index, in abs. value) 
  0.0094***   
(0.0006) 
0.0065***   
(0.0014)     
 Positive media coverage of  CEOs  
(ChI Index, in abs. value) 
 0.0094***   
(0.00181)          
 0.00711***   
(0.0015)          
Log of  Sales  
 
 -0.08    
(0.117)   
 -0.081    
(0.116)    
 Log of  Sales  
 
0.69***    
(0.227)      
0.68***    
(0.23)       
-0.048   
 (0.12)   
-0.049   
 (0.12)     
Delaware-incorporated dummy   0.11 
(0.16) 
 0.14 
(0.163)    
 GIM index 
 
-0.103   
 (0.11)     
-0.13   
 (0.11)  
-0.022   
(0.039)     
-0.02    
(0.039)     
GIM index 
 
 0.06 
(0.04)     
 0.0581*   
(0.036)      
 R&D ratio 
(per cent) 
10.07    
(8.38) 
11.55    
(8.28) 
17.14***    
(2.74)      
16.92***   
 (2.75)          
R&D ratio 
(percent) 
 17.95***    
(2.77)     
 17.9*** 
(2.755)     
 CAPEX ratio 
(per cent) 
-4.03    
(4.3)      
-5.21    
(4.27)     
-4.32*   
 (2.42)     
-4.56*    
 (2.42)     
CAPEX ratio 
(per cent) 
 -5.15**    
(2.3)     
 -5.51**    
(2. 3)     
 Sales change last year 
(per cent) 
0.0075   
(0.0066) 
0.0064    
(0.0065)     
0.0076    
(0.006)     
0.007    
(0.006)     
Sales change last year 
(percent) 
 0.011*    
(0.0062)    
 0.01* 
(0.0062)     
 Sales change last 3-years 
(per cent) 
-0.00074    
(0.019)     
0.0019    
(0.019)     
-0.006    
(0.018)      
-0.005    
(0.018)     
Sales change last 3 years 
(percent) 
 -0.01    
(0.019)      
 -0.0081   
 (0.019)    
 Sales change last 5-years 
(per cent) 
-0.0056    
(0.024)     
-0.0076   
(0.0245)     
0.025     
(0.02)     
0.022    
(0.02)     
Sales change last 5 years 
(percent) 
 0.033    
(0.021)      
 0.03 
(0.021)    
 EPS change last year 
(per cent) 
0.00004   
(0.00003)     
0.00003    
(0.000028) 
0.000022   
(0.000028)     
0.00002   
(0.000028)         
EPS change last year 
(percent) 
 0.00002    
(0.00003)    
 0.00002    
(0.00003)    
 EPS change last 3-years 
(per cent) 
0.0027    
(0.0018) 
0.0029*   
(0.0018)     
0.002    
(0.0018)     
0.0022    
(0.0018)     
EPS change last 3 years 
(percent) 
 0.002    
(0.0018)    
 0.00175    
(0.0018)     
 EPS change last 5-years 
(per cent) 
0.01** 
(0.0044) 
0.0098**  
(0.004) 
0.011***    
(0.004)      
0.01***   
(0.004)       
EPS change last 5-years 
(per cent) 
 0.011**    
(0.0043)     
 0.01** 
(0.0042)     
 CEO tenure  
(years) 
-0.001    
(0.015)         
-0.0126 
(0.015)     
-0.008    
(0.0124)     
-0.01    
(0.012)     
CEO tenure  
(years) 
 0.007    
(0.012)    
 0.004    
(0.012)    
 Constant  -3.64    
(2.383)     
-3.19    
(2.36)     
2.23 *    
(1.27)    
2.24*    
(1.27)          
Constant  1.743***    
(0.0264)   
-1.23    
(1.83)     
1.75***   
(0.026)   
-1.21 
(1.82)     
 Sample size 
 
2651 2651 2651 2651 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes  F-statistics 4.0 3.06 112.19 114.41 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes       
Sample size 2651 2651 2651 2651       
Adjusted R-squared 0.0885 0.5183 0.0873 0.585       
F-statistics  237.23 9.18 233.47 9.31       
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Table 3 
CEO Ability, Media Coverage, and Firm Valuation 
Taking into account CEO ability, this table shows results of  OLS regressions relating media coverage of  CEOs to firm value. Control 
variables are firm size (log of  sales), Delaware-incorporated dummy, GIM index, R&D ratio, Capex ratio, change of  sales, change of  EPS 
for the last one and three years, CEO tenure, and dummies for 2-digit SIC code industries (coefficients not reported in the table). The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Proxies for CEO ability are one-year-lagged excess stock returns of  firms over the value-weighted return 
(in (1) and (2)), and over the median return (in (3) and (4)) of  the four-digit SIC code industry. I respectively test this relation for indices of  
Media Coverage and Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs. Some CEOs in the sample may hold office for only one, two, or three years. Firm 
prior performance is thus attributed to former CEOs. To avoid this error, I eliminate CEOs with fewer than three years of  tenure. The 
sample consists of  2,651 firm-year observations of  firms present in the Fortune 500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. 
Estimated coefficients are marked with three, two, or one stars if  significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively, with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Media coverage of  CEOs (MCI index) 
0.0016***  
(0.00036)        
 0.0015***   
(0.0003)      
 
Positive media index of  CEOs (ChI index) 
 
 0.0072***  
(0.0016)          
 0.007***   
(0.0013)         
Log of  sales 0.13 
(0.13)     
0.124 
(0.132)    
0.07    
(0.097)         
0.07    
(0.097)    
Delaware-incorporated dummy  0.26 
(0.2)     
0.288    
(0.203)     
0.118    
(0..148)     
0.144   
(0.15)         
GIM index 0.048 
(0.042)          
0.05 
(0.041)    
0.05*   
(0.031)    
0.052* 
(0.03)         
R&D ratio 18.65***     
(3.18)    
18.80***    
(3.15)    
14.11***    
(2.42)           
14.17***    
(2.4)         
Capex ratio -3.9 
(2.53)    
-4.29* 
(2.5)      
-4.28**   
(1.98)     
-4.5**    
(1.97)    
Sales change last year 0.004    
(0.0067)     
0.0036    
(0.0067)     
0.0006    
(0.005)          
0.0004    
(0.005)   
Sales change last 3-years 0.012 
(0.0114)     
0.0114    
(0.0114)     
0.01    
(0.009)     
0.0096     
(0.009)        
EPS change last year 0.000027   
(0.00003)    
0.000025     
(0.00003)     
0.00002   
(0.00003)        
0.00002   
(0.00003)      
EPS change last 3-years 0.0054*    
(0.003)         
0.0054*   
(0.003)         
0.0022    
(0.0015)         
0.002    
(0.0015)     
      
One-year lagged excess return over the return of    
the 4-digit SIC code industry (over the median return  
of  the 4-digit SIC code industry in (3) and (4))  
 
1.01**     
(0.43)    
0.93** 
(0.43)    
1.23***    
(0.24)      
1.19***    
(0.24)      
Two-year lagged excess return over the return of    
the 4-digit SIC code industry (over the median return  
of  the 4-digit SIC code industry in (3) and (4))  
 
-0.102    
(0.431)    
-0.091 
(0.43)     
0.8***    
(0.2)      
0.78***   
(0.21)   
Three-year lagged excess return over the return of    
the 4-digit SIC code industry (over the median return  
of  the 4-digit SIC code industry in (3) and (4))  
 
0.786* 
(0.464)   
0.74 
(0.46)     
1.08***    
(0.25)           
1.06***    
(0.25)         
CEO tenure 0.011    
(0.015)      
0.008    
(0.015)  
0.007    
(0.01)     
0.0043 
(0.01)    
Constant -0.76 
(2.1)     
-0.83 
(2.08)    
-0.95    
(1.65)     
-0.96    
(1.64)    
Dummy for CEO tenure longer than 3 years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2651 2651 2651 2651 
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.59 
F-statistics 6.63 6.71 11.21 11.32 
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Table 4 
Media Coverage of  CEOs and Firm Valuation: 3-SLS Regressions 
This table reports results of  3-SLS regressions of  the following system. The first equation is the structural one relating media coverage of  
CEOs to firm valuation, controlling for CEO ability and characteristics, firm prior performance, growth prospects, and firm characteristics. 
The second equation relates Tobin’s q to the current level of  CEO media coverage, controlling for CEO ability and characteristics, firm 
current and prior performance, and firm characteristics. Proxies for CEO ability are firm excess return to the return of  the four-digit SIC 
code industry. I allow both equations to be simultaneously estimated and use three stages least square regressions (3-SLS regressions) to 
separate the effect of  media coverage on firm valuation from the effect of  firm valuation on media coverage of  CEOs.      
 
The sample consists of  2,651 firm-year observations of  firms present in the Fortune 500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. 
Estimated coefficient are marked with three, two, or one star if  significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Equation (1): Dependent Variable is Tobin’s q    Equation (2): Dependent Variable is Media Coverage of  CEOs 
 
Variables   Variables   
Media Coverage of  CEOs (MCI index) 
 
0.012**    
(0.006)    
 Tobin’s q  122.87**  
(24.38)          
     
Log of  sales  -0.38    
(0.35)    
 Log of  sales 23.62    
(22.74)  
     
Delaware-incorporated dummy 
 
0.24    
(0.5)      
 Sales changes last year -1.13    
(1.23)    
     
GIM index -0.055    
(0.101)    
 Sales changes last three years 1.14   
(2.13)         
     
R&D ratio  -9.20    
(15.39)   
 EPS change last year -0.0012     
(0.0056)       
     
CAPEX ratio -1.66    
(3.99)    
 EPS change last three years -0.53    
(0.55)     
     
Sales change last year  0.012    
(0.012)  
 One-year lagged excess return over the  
return of  the 4-digit SIC code industry 
-46.14    
(86.30)   
     
Sales change last 3-years -0.018    
(0.024)      
 Two-year lagged excess return over the  
return of  the 4-digit SIC code industry 
-193.3 **   
(88.13)   
     
EPS change last year 3.59e-06   
(0.00005)  
 Three-year lagged excess return over the  
return of  the 4-digit SIC code industry 
-70.78   
(113.8)   
     
EPS change last 3-years 0.005   
(0.005)      
 CEO tenure  3.53    
(2.8)      
     
One-year lagged excess return over the return of  the 
4-digit SIC code industry 
0.014   
(0.94)    
 Constant -388.62   
(316.01)  
     
One-year lagged excess return over the return of  the 
4-digit SIC code industry 
-0.513    
(1.02)    
 Industry dummies Yes 
   Sample size 2651 
Current excess return over the return of  the 4-digit 
SIC code industry 
1.96**    
(0.98)     
   
     
CEO tenure -0.058    
(0.051)   
   
     
Constant  4.87    
(4.12)      
   
Industry dummies Yes    
Sample size 2651    
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Table 5 
Prior Firm Valuation, CEO Turnover, and CEO Current Media Coverage 
I test whether prior firm valuation determines the current level of  media coverage and positive media coverage of  newly arrived CEOs. 
The dependent variables are current aggregate levels of  CEO media coverage (MCI index) and positive media coverage (ChI index) of  
newly arrived CEOs in their first year. Main independent variables are one- and five-year lagged Tobin’s q. Control variables are firm size 
(log of  sales); R&D ratio, Capex ratio; change of  sales for the last one, two, and five years; change of  EPS for the last one, three, and five 
years; and 2-digit SIC code industry dummies (coefficients not reported in the table). I respectively test this relation for indices of  Media 
Coverage and Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs. The original sample consists of  2,651 firm-years, from which I find 266 CEO turnovers 
during the period 1992–2002. Estimated coefficients are marked with three, two, or one stars if  significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively, with standard errors value in parentheses. 
 
Variables  MCI index MCI index ChI index ChI index 
Five-year lagged q  1.79 
(54.23)     
 2.01 
(13.5)    
 
One-year lagged q  -73.29 
(106.66)   
 -14.79 
(26.6)    
Log of  sales  
 
101.6*** 
(21.72)      
98.69 *** 
(22.0)      
22.58***    
(5.4)      
22.04***    
(5.48)      
R&D ratio 1048.88**    
(492.96)          
984.57* 
(497.45)     
253.43**    
(122.6)      
239.13*    
(123.91)         
Capex ratio 191.3    
(658.1)     
229.79 
(657.8)   
2.26 
(163.7)     
10.04    
(163.8)      
Sales change last year -0.89 
(1.65)     
-0.65 
(1.66)     
-0.25     
(0.41)     
-0.195    
(0.41)      
Sales change last three years -3.17    
(5.2)     
-4.3 
(5.3)      
-1.09 
(1.3)    
-1.36     
(1.3)     
Sales change last five years 5.26 
(6.017)     
6.16  
(6.07)     
1.98 
(1.5)     
2.19 
(1.5)     
EPS change last year  0.19 
(0.35)     
0.167 
(0.35)     
0.03 
(0.09)     
0.026    
(0.09) 
EPS change last three years -0.16     
(0.35)         
-0.18 
(0.34)     
-0.029 
(0.087)     
-0.035 
(0.086)     
EPS change last five years 
 
2.8 
(1.9)     
3.16 * 
(1.8)     
0.67 
(0.48)   
0.76 * 
(0.45)      
Constant -962.02 *   
(248.61)         
-930.87 ***    
(251.4)     
-214.5 ***    
(61.8)     
-208.65 ***    
(62.62)     
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size  2651 2651 2651 2651 
R-squared  0.62 0.59 0.62 0.59 
F-statistics  2.94 2.57 2.98 2.59 
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Table 6 
Difference in Media Coverage of  CEOs and Difference in Firm Value 
I break the sample in quintiles from (1), firms whose CEOs are in the lowest quintile, to (5), firms whose CEOs are in the highest quintile of  Media Coverage Index 
(Positive Media Coverage index respectively) and report accordingly in each cell the average q of  firms in the quintile. In the last column, I report results of  means tests 
to compare the average Tobin’s q of  firms in two extreme quintiles of  the MCI and ChI indices. The figure in parentheses in the last column is t-value, starred with 
three, two, or one stars if  significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The sample consists of  2,651 firm-year observations for 241 firms present in the 
Fortune 500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. I later extend the sample to firms present at least 6 out of  11 years of  the sample period.  
 
  
1st quintile  
 
 
2nd quintile 
 
3rd quintile 
 
4th quintile  
 
5th quintile  
 
Means test  (1) = (5) 
       
Media Coverage of CEOs  
(MCI index) 
q = 1.611204 1.7579 1.857442 1.976382 q = 2.203786 (t = - 6.618)*** 
       
Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs 
(ChI index) 
q = 1.605726 1.712406 1.794772 2.048225 q = 2.305939 (t = - 7.744)***        
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Table 7 
Media Coverage of  CEOs and Stock Return: a Portfolio Analysis 
I form portfolios from firms in the sample according to quintiles of  the MCI and ChI indices. The table shows abnormal returns of  portfolios. Monthly 
portfolios of  the year (N) are formed using annual MCI and ChI indices of  the year (N-1) and reset in January of  each year. I use Fama and French, and 
Carhart four-factor, models to compute the abnormal returns of  portfolios after controlling for SMB, HLM, RMRF, and Momentum factors. Data of  the 
factors are from Kenneth French’s website. For a definition of  factors and the Fama-French method, see Fama and French (1992, 1994). Since the sample 
period spans from January 1992 to December 2002, I have 120 monthly return data. Controlling for the four factors, the alphas are the excess return of  the 
trading strategy based on the MCI and ChI indices over a passive trading strategy. The first rows of  Panel A and Panel B show the difference in returns 
between portfolios of  firms in the highest quintile and in the lowest quintile of  each index. The sample consists of  2,651 observations for 241 firms present 
in the Fortune 500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. Estimated coefficients are marked with three, two, or one stars if  significant at 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively, with the standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Trading on the Media Coverage Index of  CEOs (MCI Index) 
 
 Alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Buying the highest MCI’s quintile -  
Selling the lowest MCI’s quintile 
0.0066***   
(0.0022)        
0.076 
(0.058)  
-0.24***   
(0.058) 
-0.81***   
(0.073)    
-0.049 
(.039)    
      
1st (lowest) quintile of  MCI index 
 
0.0024   
(0.0018)        
0.91***  
(0.047)   
-0.094**   
(0.048)     
0.62***    
(0.06)    
-0.0073    
(0.032)    
      
2nd quintile of  MCI index 0.0045*   
(0.0024)        
0.81***    
(0.063)    
-0.26***    
(.063)  
0.426***   
(0.08)         
-0.0467  
(0.043)      
      
3rd quintile of  MCI index 0.0041*   
(0.0022)        
0.814***    
(0.06)       
-0.198***   
(0.059)    
0.42***    
(0.074)      
-0.018     
(0.04) 
      
4th quintile of  MCI index 0.0035*   
(0.00189)        
0.86***    
(0.05)   
-0.33***   
(0.05)  
0.21***  
(0.0625)  
0.05 
(0.0336)     
      
5th (highest) quintile of  MCI index 
 
0.009***  
(0.0014)      
0.99***    
(0.038)      
-0.34***   
(0.038)      
-0.19***   
(0.048)    
-0.057**   
(0.026)     
 
 
Panel B:  Trading on the Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs (ChI Index) 
 
 Alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Buying the highest ChI’s quintile -  
Selling the lowest ChI’s quintile 
0.0058**   
(0.0024)        
0.128**    
(0.064)         
-0.134** 
(0.064)        
-0.69***  (0.08)   -0.06    
(0.043)   
      
1st (lowest) quintile of  ChI index 0.002    
(0.002)         
0.866***    
(0.05)         
-0.21***    
(0.05)      
0.5***   
(0.0623)      
0.0216   
(0.033)      
      
2nd  quintile of  ChI index 0.007***  
(0.0022)         
0.87***    
(0.059)         
-0.045 
(0.06)     
0.48*** 
(0.074)          
-0.069*  
(0.04)        
      
3rd quintile of  ChI index 0.0034    
(0.002)         
0.82*** 
(0.056)    
-0.21***   
(0.057)         
0.37***  
(0.071)    
0.0173 
(0.04)         
      
4th quintile of  ChI index 
 
0.006***   
(0.0021)  
0.824***    
(0.055)        
-0.38***  
(0.055)    
0.22***   
(0.069)          
-0.0316   
(0.037)        
      
5th (highest) quintile of  ChI index 
 
0.0078***   
(0.0015)         
0.99***   
(0.039)         
-0.34***   
(0.039)   
-0.19***   
(0.048)         
-0.038   
(0.026)   
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Table 8 
Media Coverage of  CEOs and Subsequent CEO Remuneration 
This table reports the relationship between media coverage of  CEOs and subsequent CEO compensation. In Panel A, I break the sample in quintiles from (1), firms whose CEOs are in the lowest quintile, to 
(5), firms whose CEOs are in the highest quintile of  using one year-lagged MCI and ChI indices, and reports accordingly the quintile’s average compensation. For each year (N), MCI and ChI are measured in 
the year (N-1) and compensation is measured in the year (N). In the last column, I report results of  mean tests to compare the average CEO compensation of  firms in two extreme quintiles of  the one-year 
lagged MCI and ChI indexes. The figure in parentheses in the last column is t-value, starred with three, two, or one stars if  significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Panel B shows results of  
OLS regressions models relating prior CEO media coverage to CEO compensation. Control variables are firm size (log of  sales), change of  sales for the last one, two and five years, CEO tenure, dummies for 
industries (2-digit SIC code), and dummies for years. CEO incentive pay (option-based pay less salary and bonus) in (1) and (2), total cash compensation (salary + bonus, Execucomp’s TCC item ) in (3) and (4), 
and total compensation (including any kind of  compensation) in (5) and (6) are dependent variables, respectively. As defined in Execucomp (Item TDC1), CEO total compensation includes cash, bonus, 
restricted stock granted, options granted, long-term incentive plan, and all other compensation. Incentive pay is the difference between TDC1 and TCC in Execucomp. I respectively test this relation for the 
indices of  Media Coverage and Positive Media Coverage of  CEOs. The main independent variables are one year-lagged MCI and ChI indices. The sample consists of  2,651 firm-year observations from 241 
firms present in the Fortune 500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. The estimated coefficients are marked with three, two, or one stars if  significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, 
with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A: Difference in Media Coverage and Difference in Subsequent CEO Remuneration 
 
Using one year-lagged MCI index 
 
 1st (lowest) quintile of   MCI  2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile (highest) of  MCI Means Tests (1) = (5) 
       
CEO incentive compensation (in thousand USD) 3025.177 3767.375 4542.611 5604.754 12083.92 (t = -5.16)*** 
       
CEO cash compensation (in thousand USD) 1499.809 1745.054 1911.318 2255.762 3202.049 (t = -9.47)***         
       
CEO total compensation (in thousand USD) 4529.126 5519.213 6453.93 7860.516 15289.46 (t=-5.98)*** 
       
 
 
 
 
Using one year-lagged ChI index 
 
 1st (lowest) quintile of  ChI 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th (highest) quintile of  ChI Means Tests (1) = (5) 
       
CEO incentive compensation (in thousand USD) 3022.578 4280.321 4966.438 5587.018 12066.33 (t = -5.96)*** 
       
CEO cash compensation (in thousand USD) 1587.672 1748.855 1937.434 2374.002 3174.867 (t = -10.24)***         
       
CEO total compensation (in thousand USD) 4617.241 6031.298 6903.872 7962.854 15241.19 (t = -6.83)*** 
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Table 8 
Media Coverage of  CEOs and Subsequent CEO Remuneration 
 
Panel B: Media Coverage of  CEOs and Subsequent CEO Remuneration 
 
Variables  CEO incentive pay (1) CEO incentive pay (2) CEO cash pay (3) CEO cash pay (4) CEO total pay (5) CEO total pay (6) 
One-year-lagged MCI Index 4.67*    
(2.54)    
 0.52** 
(0.25)      
 5.19** 
(2.59)     
 
       
One-year-lagged ChI index  24.43**    
(10.04)    
 4.23*** 
(0.97)      
 28.67*** 
(10.23)    
       
One-year-lagged Tobin’s q  782.58**    
(382.41)   
711.36*    
(381.31)  
49.55    
(37.00)     
22.41 
(36.79) 
    
832.42** 
(389.96)      
734.09* 
(388.73)     
       
Log of  sales  2839.14***   
(565.34)    
2786.89***    
 (563.44) 
816.64***    
(54.61)     
794.10*** 
(54.28) 
      
3652.12*** 
(576.52)      
3577.29*** 
(574.40)      
       
Sale change last year (percent) 0.36    
(21.95)   
 0.36    
       (21.93)  
0.406    
(2.12)     
0.40    
(2.11) 
0.72 
(22.38)     
0.71 
(22.36)     
       
Sale change last three years (percent) 182.44*** 
(67.04)      
       184.43***    
       (67.00)    
8.11 
(6.48)     
8.83 
(6.45)    
190.86*** 
(68.37)      
193.58*** 
(68.31) 
      
       
Sales change last five years (percent) -164.2**    
(74.57)      
       -167.75**    
       (74.56)   
-13.44* 
(7.18)     
-14.41** 
(7.16)      
-177.97** 
(76.04) 
-182.46** 
(76.01)   
       
CEO tenure (years) -37.00 
(57.87)     
       -43.02    
       (57.96)   
27.41*** 
(5.60)      
25.87***    
(5.59)      
-9.64 
(59.01) 
-17.19 
(59.09) 
       
Constant -26013.33**   
(7059.34)     
       -25451.38***    
       (7045.01)        
-5771.28***     
(707.10)    
-5533.78*** 
(704.22)     
-32388.54*** 
(7198.83) 
-31593.58*** 
(7182.04)     
       
Industry dummies YES        YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Year dummies YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Sample size  2651        2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0740        0.0751 0.3743 0.3785 0.1028 0.1044 
F-statistics 3.85        3.9 20.82 21.20 5.09 5.16 
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Table 9 
Change in Media Coverage and Subsequent CEO Remuneration 
This table reports the relationship between change in media coverage of  CEOs and subsequent CEO compensation. Control variables are firm size (log of  sales); change of  sales for the last one, two, and five 
years; CEO tenure; dummies for industries (2-digit SIC code); and dummies for years. CEO incentive pay (option-based pay less salary and bonus) in (1) and (2), total cash compensation (salary + bonus, 
Execucomp’s TCC item ) in (3) and (4), and total compensation (including any kind of  compensation) in (5) and (6) are dependent variables, respectively. As defined in Execucomp (Item TDC1), CEO total 
compensation includes cash, bonus, restricted stock granted, options granted, long-term incentive plan, and all other compensation. Incentive pay is the difference between TDC1 and TCC in Execucomp. I 
respectively test this relation for change in levels of  media coverage and positive media coverage of  CEOs. The main independent variables are changes in MCI and ChI indices from year (N-1) to year (N). The 
sample consists of  2,651 firm-year observations from 241 firms present in the Fortune 500 list during all 11 years of  the period 1992–2002. The estimated coefficients are marked with three, two, or one stars if  
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Variables  CEO incentive pay 
(1) 
CEO incentive pay (2) CEO cash pay (3) CEO cash pay (4) CEO total pay (5) CEO total pay (6) 
 
Change in MCI Index  
(year N, year N-1) 
12.12***    
(3.51) 
 -1.74***    
(0.34) 
 10.38***    
(3.58)           
 
       
Change in CHI Index  
(year N, year N-1) 
 75.36***    
(13.30)    
 -7.08***    
(1.29)    
 68.28***     
(13.59)    
       
One-year-lagged Tobin’s q  1055.54***   
(358.98)      
1093.41***     
(357.38)   
71.39**    
(34.63)      
69.47**    
(34.61)     
1127.27***    
(366.43)      
1163.24*** 
(365.08)      
       
Log of  sales  3003.44***   
(551.77)       
3105.77***    
(549.01)   
848.84*** 
(53.14)      
836.60***    
(53.07)     
3848.73*** 
(563.22)      
3938.73*** 
(560.84)      
       
Sale change last year (percent) 2.66    
(21.91)     
3.65    
(21.81)   
0.12     
(2.11)    
0.14    
(2.10)     
2.73 
(22.40)     
3.73    
(22.28)     
       
Sale change last three years (percent) 173.88*** 
(66.83)      
171.65***     
(66.51)     
7.79    
(6.43)     
7.88    
(6.42)    
181.96*** 
(68.21)      
179.82*** 
(67.95)   
       
Sales change last five years (percent) -162.87** 
(74.36)     
-167.18**   
(74.01)   
-12.07*    
(7.14)      
-11.90* 
(7.13)     
-175.21** 
(75.90)     
-179.35** 
(75.61) 
    
       
CEO tenure (years) -40.47 
(57.68)    
-47.33    
(57.41) 
29.97***    
(5.56)      
30.04***    
(5.56)      
-10.54 
(58.88)     
-17.33 
(58.65)  
       
Constant -27650.97***   
(6945.36)      
-28199.07***    
(6910.85)     
-6115.44***    
(694.93)     
-6009.83*** 
(694.02)     
-34351.69*** 
(7089.55)     
-34820.54*** 
(7059.72)     
       
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Sample size  2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 
Adjusted R-squared 0.078 0.086 0.3629 0.3817 0.1046 0.1365 
F-statistics 4.01 4.38 21.39 21.49 5.17 5.49 
 
